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INTRODUCTION 
International law is a matter primarily for governments. Governments 
form and administer international law,1 and in this context, governments 
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fascinatingly react to private commercial and financial initiatives. 
Businesspersons often challenge governments, and defining and 
conceptualizing this challenge is necessary to understand international law.  
United States President Donald Trump’s approach to international 
trade law should be seen in this light. He believes that the previous U.S. 
administrations did not make the necessary effort vis-à-vis corporations 
and foreign governments to favor the U.S. in foreign trade. President 
Trump believes that he is now giving the correct signals and incentives to 
businesspersons to contribute to the U.S. foreign trade and economy.  
A similar sort of tension exists in the approach of governments 
worldwide to the issue of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies, e.g., Bitcoin, 
constitute a challenge to the current international financial and trade 
system as regulated by governments. Governments wish to control the 
development of cryptocurrencies through taxation, regulation, or even 
through prohibition.  
This Article sets forth two examples of evidence to substantiate the 
above argument: it starts by discussing international commercial law as a 
concept, with a focus on international commercial arbitration (“ICA”). 
This Article highlights the similarities between ICA and public 
international law dispute settlement. The Article then turns to 
cryptocurrencies, particularly bitcoin, the most important cryptocurrency 
for market capitalization.  
I. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) is the foremost 
private business and commercial organization worldwide. The study of the 
ICC helps us to see the relationship between businesspersons and 
governments and understand international commercial law.  
A. The International Chamber of Commerce 
International disputes or the prospect of international disputes disturb 
businesspersons and corporations, which therefore take initiatives to 
counter them. This disturbance is obvious in the fact that entrepreneurs 
established the ICC just after World War I in 1919. Businesspersons 
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 1. See Frederic Megret, Globalization, in 4 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 497 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
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believed that governments that did not consider business interests caused 
World War I; those businesspeople thus took the opportunity to enhance 
international commerce without relying on any government’s 
endorsement or initiative.  
Corporations are part of the so-called international community.2 The 
relationship between corporations and the international community is 
contradictory as international law generally does not grant corporations 
the status of subject.3 The ICC is businesses challenging governments—
that is, businesses wish to be endorsed by governments as part of the so-
called international community. The establishment of the ICC signals to 
governments that the concerns of businesses are common and universal 
and that they would be strongly voiced by the ICC.  
Nevertheless, “there is no general international corporate law as such 
and the recognition of international legal personality for corporations 
remains elusive.”4 Although the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has 
recognized separate legal personalities for corporations,5 this recognition 
does not confer upon corporations the status of the “subject of international 
law.” A corporation’s personality stems from national laws and therefore 
does not, and cannot, represent an international legal personality 
participating in international law.  
The ICC is a private enterprise of corporations. It is the most 
representative business organization worldwide and is considered a 
platform for networking and establishing acquaintances.6 The ICC 
represents the notion that businesses possess a global language. Business 
gatherings have long existed, but the ICC innovatively instilled a 
permanent staff and secretariat, the objective of which is to create a 
clearing house for business information.7 Governments are too ideological 
and nationalistic—acting only in narrow self-interest—to act as the neutral 
                                                                                                             
 2. Andrea Paulus, International Community, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2013).  
 3. A subject of international law is deemed capable of having rights and 
obligations and can contract on the international stage. A subject of international 
law can sue other subjects before international courts and tribunals. See Megret, 
supra note 1, at 496. 
 4. Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 52 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2014).  
 5. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 5); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. 
Rep. Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 582 (May 24).  
 6. John H. Fahey, The International Chamber of Commerce, 94 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 126, 128–29 (1921).  
 7. Id. at 127. 
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medium of business information. The ICC represents the idea that 
“[g]lobal issues are issues that arise at the level of the entire world, and for 
which the State as a normative unit is deemed ultimately insufficient.”8 
Because of its information-production capacity, entrepreneurship, and 
dispute resolution functions, the ICC has established a certain 
“commercial order”—a commercial order established under the auspices 
of private operators without the intricacies of national sovereignty, which 
inherently leads to conflicts and wars. The ICC has primarily created a 
certain autonomous space of maneuver for inter-business relations and 
disputes. By establishing common standards for commerce and inter-
business dispute settlement modalities, such as mediation and arbitration, 
the ICC established a certain protected domain of businesses. The ICC 
intended for the “new commercial order” to lead a global logic of capital, 
trade, and investment. 
The ICC is thus the embodiment of the rationality of the international 
commercial community. Although it is not the only business organization, 
it remains the most comprehensive. ICC arbitration is also the most 
popular commercial arbitration worldwide. The ICC does not represent the 
repudiation of public international law; rather, it strengthens international 
law by closely realigning it with commercial matters outside the intricacies 
of diplomacy. ICA closely resembles mainstream dispute settlement 
mechanisms in public international law. 
This perspective of the ICC is more understandable in modern times. 
At present, governments patently seek to “harness international law for 
commercial ends.”9 Public international law seems to be the focus of 
contention in international commerce. U.S. President Donald Trump’s 
criticism of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is evidence of such 
contention. President Trump has promised “to slap tariffs on foreign 
imports or to walk away from decades-old defence pacts.”10 President 
Trump insists on the central role of the American government to “rectify 
mistakes” so that the American economy and American businesses may 
                                                                                                             
 8. Megret, supra note 1, at 498. 
 9. Sonya Seats, Trumpian Isolationism Could Help China Become a Leader 
in International Law, CHATHAM HOUSE (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.chathamhouse 
.org/expert/comment/trumpian-isolationism-could-help-china-become-leader-inter  
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 10. How Donald Trump Thinks About Trade, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21709921-americas-next-president-
wants-pull-out-existing-trade-deals-and-put-future-ones [http://perma.cc/5RW6-G 
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2019] BUSINESSPERSONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND INT’L LAW 753 
 
 
 
flourish again.11 Indeed, this rhetoric contributed to President Trump’s 
election victory as American citizens felt that their government had not 
done enough to keep businesses and jobs at home. The WTO, a public 
international law organization, does not sufficiently cater to American 
interests.  
President Trump has argued that the previous American administrations 
did not make “good” agreements with the rest of the world.12 This statement 
is a direct criticism of current public international law—intergovernmental 
law. For example, he argued that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(“TPP”)13 was too liberal a treaty and would undermine the American 
economy.14 Indeed, Trump’s first action following his inauguration was 
issuing an executive order blocking the TPP. His blocking of the TPP is an 
example of the perception that international law—for example, trade 
treaties—is an instrument for governments when pursuing national trade 
interests. Governments politicize and instrumentalize trade with their 
domestic constituencies in mind, yet governments’ policies and actions may 
not always ensure success for businesses, which often feel that the 
“government approach” may not effectively serve their interests.  
It is not only the current U.S. president, but also other candidates and 
former presidents who have made international trade the centerpiece of their 
domestic policies,15 confirming that international law, and international 
commercial law in particular, has always been a matter for domestic politics. 
“States’ preferences for a rule-based system of international law can turn on 
how domestic policy decisions are made and how international law can 
change domestic politics.”16 Often, “[government officials] value 
                                                                                                             
 11. “Mr Trump will demand the renegotiation of existing trade pacts or would 
threaten to pull out of them . . . . ‘The era of trade deficits is over.’” Id.  
 12.  Louis Nelson, Trump blames past presidents as far back as George H.W. 
Bush for economic woes, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2018/03/07/trump-us-economy-past-presidents-444076 [https://perma.cc/T 
6C6-EXB2].  
 13. The TPP is a draft trade agreement between Canada, Australia, Brunei, 
Japan, Chile, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, and the 
United States. The United States withdrew from the TPP on January 23, 2017. 
The text of the TPP is accessible at http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text [http://perma 
.cc/D33A-TH36] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).  
 14. How Donald Trump Thinks About Trade, supra note 10.  
 15. Trade, At What Price?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.econ 
omist.com/united-states/2016/04/02/trade-at-what-price [http://perma.cc/Z6HE-
TEFM].  
 16. Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade 
Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 253 (2006). 
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international law when it offers an advantage in domestic politics.”17 The 
ICC is thus the business response to the politicization of public 
international law.  
The government–business nexus often emerges in the international 
system. As it gained momentum at the start of the 20th century among 
governments, businesses began closely scrutinizing public international 
law, the physical evidence of which is the “Peace Palace” in the Hague, 
Netherlands.18 Andrew Carnegie originally built it as a home for the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration after the 1899 Hague Conference and that 
now houses the International Court of Justice; additionally, John D. 
Rockefeller,19 another prominent businessman, donated the land on which 
the headquarters of the United Nations was built. Businessmen donating 
land and buildings does not mean that international law is or has been 
under the control of the global capital and the business community; rather 
in the development of public international law, a close symbiosis and 
interaction between governments and business has existed with bilateral 
influence.  
For instance, one of the earliest and foremost subjects of public 
international law—the protection of aliens—has generally concerned the 
protection of overseas business interests.20 Businesses resort to their own 
governments when they feel the host government has wronged them and 
blocked their access to justice. The case of a wronged individual in the 
hands of the host government becomes a matter for the assertion of the 
legitimate sovereign rights of the home state against the host state.21 The 
strong presence of governments and the near-absence of businesses in this 
classical equation of international law is so stark that governments have 
near-absolute authority to pursue or renounce a business claim. In 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id.  
 18. MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD, THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA, 
1815 TO THE PRESENT 82–83 (Allen Lane ed., 2013). 
 19. Id. at 219. 
 20. ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33 (2d ed. 2005).  
 21. See The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment, 1924 
P.C.I.J. 12 (ser. A) No. 2. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by 
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his 
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the 
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, 
therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private 
interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is 
irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of 
one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter, 
the State is the sole claimant. Id. 
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addition, as soon as the government adopts the business claim, it becomes 
solely a government claim. The ICC initiative, however, aims to reverse 
the complete dependence of businesses on governments with regard to 
dispute settlement, information, and enforcement. The ICC thus represents 
a rebalancing initiative that favors business in the government–business 
equation.  
The ICC has not eliminated the ability of businesses to lobby 
governments, which remains commonplace. Informally, businesses 
continue to lobby their governments to act, such as in the WTO. The ICC 
has created, however, a formal, systematic, and more tangible mode of 
lobbying and has helped institutionalize and formalize businesses’ lobbying 
of governments—for instance, via consultative membership of the ICC in 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council.  
Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (“UN”) 
and the WTO are the foremost representatives of public international law, 
and the ICC intensely lobbies both to communicate business concerns. For 
example, the former Secretary General of the ICC, John Danilovich, had 
both an ambassadorial and a business background and developed relations 
with intergovernmental organizations.22 The ICC Secretary General is an 
entrepreneur dealing with both governments and companies alike, a post 
that necessitates a language and a style to address both. From the ICC’s 
beginning, personalities with experience in business, government, or both 
have composed the ICC administration.23 That is to say, the ICC is aware 
of the close relationship between the international commercial order and 
public international law.  
B. The International Commercial Order and Public International Law 
The government–business symbiosis reached its apex with the 
foundation of the ICC in 1919 and the WTO in 1995. The ICC was 
envisaged as a purely business-oriented institution, with membership 
restricted to businesses and business chambers; it became a platform for 
businesses to develop business-facilitating ideas and lobby governments.  
In contrast, the WTO is an intergovernmental organization, albeit one 
that does not regulate all international trade. Only governments address each 
other on the WTO platform; businesses do not have a formal presence in the 
WTO, and only governments agree upon WTO rules. Although 
                                                                                                             
 22. See Chairmanship and Secretary General, INT’L CHAMBER COM., https:/ 
/iccwbo.org/about-us/governance/chairmanship-secretary-general/ [http://perma. 
cc/R29Y-LJUS ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).  
 23. Fahey, supra note 6, at 129. 
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governments may resort to WTO dispute settlement, businesses cannot. 
Only governments may sue and be sued before the WTO panels, and 
businesses may only lobby governments to take such an initiative in the 
WTO. The WTO order involves constant interaction between governments 
and businesses.24 
The ICC “commercial order” involves a specific dispute settlement 
different from the WTO; arbitration among private commercial operators 
is the lynchpin of this commercial order. The commercial order excluded, 
to a great extent, the interference of national governments and national 
courts. This exclusion protects the “privacy” of dispute settlement from 
the intricacies of national judiciaries. The ICC fills the gap the incomplete 
intergovernmental system of the WTO left.  
ICA completes international law. That is, arbitration, as referred to in 
the UN Charter,25 is not limited merely to arbitration between 
governments. The term “arbitration” covers commercial disputes between 
private operators as well. Nothing in the UN Charter limits the scope of 
arbitration to only intergovernmental disputes.  
Hence, the ICC order and its most important component, the ICA, are 
integral parts of the international legal order that the League of Nations 
established in the 20th century and that continue under the successor 
institution, the UN. The ICC order constitutes a specific kind of law—
namely, the ICC law. Notwithstanding the differences between the 
institutions and the stakeholders, public international law as the UN 
represented it and “private” international commercial law as the ICC 
represented it have, after World War I, undertaken parallel trajectories that 
have influenced each other. Indeed, both international law and the ICC law 
promote open markets for goods and services.  
                                                                                                             
 24. Brewster, supra note 16, at 277–78. A typical example of companies 
convincing their governments to go to the WTO dispute settlement is the 
American photographic paper and film company Kodak’s complaint against the 
Japanese government’s purported policy favoring another photographic paper and 
film company, the Japanese Fuji. The U.S. administration took Kodak’s claim to 
the WTO dispute resolution over alleged Japanese unfair trade practices favouring 
Fuji. Id.; WORLD TRADE ORG., REPORT OF THE PANEL, DS44/R, JAPAN – 
MEASURES AFFECTING CONSUMER PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM AND PAPER (1998), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds44_e.htm [http://perma. 
cc/FNC2-SSUW]. 
 25. U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1 (“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice.”). 
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The reference in the UN Charter to the economic dimension of 
international peace and security26 bolsters the assertion that international 
commerce and ICA are natural components of international law. This 
economic dimension necessitates the participation of private actors. 
Traditional public international law regulating the relations between 
governments, as the UN embodied, is not necessarily against “private” 
participation. And the ICA, as private actors operate it, is not a dispute 
settlement system isolated from public international law.  
The counterargument is that there is no need to integrate private 
international commerce and the ICA within the paradigm of classical 
public international law, as commerce has a logic of its own and the ICA 
is a sui generis dispute settlement method with its own understandings and 
paradigms. Forcing ICA into the straitjacket of public international law 
would create an artificial holism and would be a fruitless academic effort. 
International law has already greatly fragmented.  
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals that lack 
centralized coordination epitomizes the fragmentation. The ICJ, also 
known as the World Court, does not sit hierarchically at the top of these 
international courts, nor does it exercise appellate function over other 
courts and tribunals. The ICJ is not the “constitutional court” of the world 
legal order. The term “constitutional” denotes comprehensiveness, 
consistency, and harmony in the system. The ICJ cannot invoke these 
values against other international courts and tribunals. Likewise, the ICJ 
does not oversee ICA. 
Be that as it may, ICA still operates within the confines of public 
international law. This conclusion is not a result of an artificial and purely 
theoretical categorization but is based rather on evidence like the 
similarities between ICA and dispute settlement mechanisms in public 
international law.  
C. Similarities of International Commercial Arbitration and Public 
International Law Dispute Settlement   
Dispute settlement is essential to understanding the identity of a 
system. A dispute forces the limits of a system and demonstrates the 
ultimate capacity and flexibility of the established legal order. Two 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. pmbl. (“[T]o employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples . . . .”). Id. art. 1, ¶ 3 ( “To achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . .”). 
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purportedly different legal orders cannot be compared merely through 
their formal laws and regulations. Rather, the real benchmark for 
differentiating legal orders is the legal orders’ treatment of disputes. The 
similarities and parallels between ICA and public international law dispute 
settlement—the mainstream dispute settlement in public international 
law—lead to the conclusion that ICA is merely an extension of public 
international law’s dispute settlement mechanism. This conclusion in turn 
leads to the inference that the current world system is still government-
based.  
1. Western Foundations 
Western leadership exists both in public international law dispute 
settlement and in ICA. This could be inferred from the fact that major 
international dispute settlement venues are in the West, such as the 
International Court of Justice—The Hague—and the International 
Chamber of Commerce—Paris. International dispute settlement methods 
primarily originate in the Western world, and Western governments and 
companies have developed and refined the methods through disputes and 
challenges. Although the “Western way”—if it may be termed such—of 
settling disputes has not forcibly imposed itself upon the rest of the world, 
it remains a truism that the fundamental ideas and principles underlying 
international dispute settlement stem from Western legal systems.  
The ICJ is the judicial organ of the UN, an institution Western powers 
primarily established,27 and judges representing the main Western legal 
systems on the bench of the ICJ have always existed. Concomitantly, the 
WTO is chiefly a creation of the U.S. and Europe;28 the West took the 
initiative for the establishment of both the UN and the WTO. The Western 
world can thus be said to be the standard bearer and the institution 
entrepreneur.  
Western predominance is also palpable in the ICA. Intra-Western 
debates generally direct ICA discussions. For instance, the current debate 
on the “discovery” process—a way of evidence-gathering in U.S. courts 
allowing one party to the dispute to demand all relevant evidence from the 
opposing party—and the objections by adherents of European civil law to 
its compatibility with the nature of the ICA point to an intra-Western 
debate between American legal culture and continental European legal 
                                                                                                             
 27. See generally MARK MAZOWER, NO ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF 
EMPIRE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2009).  
 28. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: 
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
595, 616 (2007). 
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culture. Indeed, the International Bar Association’s rules on evidence—
which many commercial arbitral tribunals voluntarily follow—represent a 
balance between the American mode of discovery and the continental 
European habit of demanding only a limited amount of evidence.29 
American and European arbitrators’ and counsels’ dominant presence in 
the international arbitral world is a natural fact.30 Arbitrators’ and 
counsels’ discussions among themselves as to the style and procedure do 
not question, challenge, or threaten the Western foundations of the ICA. 
The ICC is an institution established as a result of the deal between 
Americans and Europeans—the advanced capitalist world—in the 
aftermath of World War I. The ICC is the result of an intra-western 
business vision and subsequent cooperation.31  
2. Lack of Binding Precedent 
Neither the ICA nor public international law dispute settlement 
techniques consider the entire picture. Both methods focus on the dispute 
on hand; they do not claim to harmonize and reconfigure the international 
system. Granted, the ICJ, the foremost court of public international law 
dispute settlement, regularly refers to its previous decisions to convey the 
idea that international law is a harmonious system. The panels and 
appellate bodies of the WTO—currently the most popular public 
international law dispute settlement mechanism—also refer to the WTO’s 
previous decisions. However, there is no rule of binding precedent in those 
two prominent public international law dispute mechanisms; there is also 
no formal obligation to refer to previous decisions.  
Previous decisions do not have a formal binding force upon later 
similar cases. In public international law dispute settlement, merely an 
acknowledgement of previous decisions exists. In both the ICJ and the 
WTO systems, previous decisions have an “influence” upon subsequent 
cases. The ICJ always refers to its previous rulings, and the WTO 
Appellate Body, in its Japanese Alcoholic Beverages case,32 explained that 
                                                                                                             
 29. New revised IBA Rules on Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, 
INT’L B. ASS’N (June 30, 2010), http://www.ibanet.org/ENews_Archive/IBA_30 
June_2010_Enews_Taking_of_Evidence_new_rules.aspx [http://perma.cc/T7TT-
4CEG].  
 30. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN 
VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996).  
 31. Fahey, supra note 6, at 127.  
 32. WORLD TRADE ORG., APPELLATE BODY, AB-1996-2, JAPAN – TAXES ON 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 13 (1996), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/ 
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the previous WTO panel and Appellate Body rulings affect later ones. The 
use of prior panel and Appellate Body rulings is extensive in the WTO 
jurisprudence. Put simply, there is an altruistic and public dimension to 
general dispute settlement in international law. The ICJ and the WTO’s 
method is not comparable to national common law or national civil law 
systems—this is an idiosyncratic feature of international law. Arguably, 
the distinction is merely because of the paradoxical attitude of 
governments to international law: on the one hand, governments, in theory, 
do not wish to limit their sovereignty through consistent past decisions of 
an international court. On the other hand, when governments run into a 
concrete legal dispute with other governments, they wish to see reliable 
decision-making mechanisms by the international courts they establish.  
Likewise, business-oriented private arbitral dispute resolutions 
possess a public dimension. “Private” ICA decisions have repercussions 
for the entire international commercial system, which one cannot ignore 
or neglect. Although no formal binding precedent rule exists in ICA, 
arbitrators compensate for that. Arbitrators, particularly experienced 
arbitrators, internalize a certain style of decisions in similar cases. The 
disputing parties choose arbitrators on the basis of their previous decisions. 
Whether arbitrators favor sticking to the letter of the contract, have a 
specific method of contract interpretation, or favor the host country or the 
investor, determines a certain kind of binding precedent in the personality 
of arbitrators. 
3. Legal Standing of Individuals 
Public international law dispute settlement is concerned not only with 
disputes between governments; individuals—both natural persons and 
corporations—are becoming more prominent in international dispute 
settlement. This prominence is evident in the ascendancy of international 
human rights law and regional human rights courts, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights. The ICC epitomizes the rising status of the 
individual in the international legal landscape, in that it permits the legal 
                                                                                                             
cases/WTDS8ABR.pdf [http://perma.cc/HV8F-FTXE] (“Adopted panel reports 
are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by 
subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, 
and therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.”); id. at 13 n.30 (“[T]he Statute of the International Court of Justice has 
an explicit provision, Article 59, to the same effect. This has not inhibited the 
development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which 
considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible.”). 
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standing of individuals. ICA confirms the individual’s rising status all the 
more as it elevates the standing of the individual entering into cross-border 
commercial transactions. The individual no longer relies upon his 
government to vindicate his commercial rights at an international level; 
rather, he can now unilaterally invoke his commercial interests.  
ICA protects a specific type of individual, namely the wealthy 
businessperson or the corporation, whereas international human rights law 
protects the individual, regardless of status. ICA, rather than being a 
universally applicable remedy, can therefore protect a closed and already 
privileged group. ICA may not be an integral part of international law, as 
the world vision and the specific concerns of this closed group shape it. 
ICA’s role in international law should therefore not be overstated. 
Even if not integral to international law, ICA has contributed to 
international law. International law has long tried to regulate international 
commerce, an effort that culminated in the establishment of the WTO in 
1995.33 The WTO represents the intergovernmental method of dealing 
with international commerce, with individuals and businesses having only 
a marginal role—that is, through the lobbying of their respective 
governments to act in the WTO.  ICA thus fills a gap that the 
intergovernmental WTO created because it lifts the private individual in 
dispute settlement to a global level and gives him a formal status. The 
individual is no longer left to the mercies of his own government in the 
context of commercial affairs.  
The individual ICA envisaged engages in cross-border commercial 
activity, and by connecting different markets and jurisdictions, the 
individual engages in activities distinct from the rest of society. In doing 
so, he accepts certain benefits and risks that result in involvement in cross-
border activity. It is this specific individual with whom ICA deals. It is 
therefore natural to expect a specific method of dispute settlement. ICA 
treats special commercial connectors in a tailored manner and does not 
discriminate among them. This is obvious from the fact that the constituent 
documents of ICA, such as the arbitration rules of the ICC, do not make 
any discrimination among the commercial operators wishing to engage the 
ICC.34 The special treatment of a delineated individual does not exclude 
ICA from international law. Rather, ICA strengthens international law by 
extending the reach of law to a specific individual—the businessperson.  
                                                                                                             
 33. The multilateral trading system—past, present and future, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XB6L-P4V9] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).  
 34. Arbitration Rules, INT’L CHAMBER COM., https://iccwbo.org/dis pute-
resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/KE8R-
F23F] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
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4. Commerce and International Peace and Security 
Public international law dispute settlement does not always directly 
deal with the issues of peace and security; an economic and prosperity 
dimension also exists, and ICA is in the context of the latter. From a global 
perspective, ICA cannot be reduced to isolated, ad hoc, and purely 
technical commercial dispute settlements. As such, ICA has a wide 
background—arguably, effective commercial dispute settlement increases 
the quantity and the quality of international business transactions and 
cross-border trade. In turn, ICA contributes to international peace and 
security. ICA therefore improves the prosperity and wellbeing of the 
international community. 
At a minimum, ICA must not violate international peace and security, 
which is the foremost objective of the UN. ICA is a method of preventing 
commercial disputes from turning into a threat to international peace and 
security. Thanks to this understanding, ICA is an integral part of 
international law that serves international peace and security.  
Striving for peace and security is in line with the emergence of modern 
international law, as per the First and Second Hague Conferences, in 1899 
and 1907 respectively.35 The motivations of both conferences were to limit 
potential arms races and to hinder the dire economic consequences of such 
rivalries. As such, international law efforts from the outset have viewed 
international peace and security through the lens of both hard power—
armaments and the use of force—and soft power—the economic and 
commercial dimension.  
International law aims to open markets to goods and services and the 
free flow of capital as proved by the WTO and the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) policies. Economic and commercial stability and prosperity 
are thus crucial and inseparable parts of international peace and security 
objectives, and are embedded within those objectives. It was not merely a 
clash of ideologies, systems, cultures, or values that caused the two world 
wars, but rather commercial competition and a clash of trading interests, a 
fact of which the creators of the post-World War II international order 
were all too cognizant. This economic dimension of international law is 
evident in ICA, too. Peace and stability among businesses and 
corporations contribute to international peace and security.  
                                                                                                             
 35. The Laws of War, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject 
_menus/lawwar.asp [http://perma.cc/35NW-JSV2] (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) 
(providing links to multiple conventions and declarations from the two Hague 
Conventions).  
2019] BUSINESSPERSONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND INT’L LAW 763 
 
 
 
5. Practicalities 
Public international law dispute settlement represents the tension 
between the theory and the practice of law. Law achieves its ultimate 
objective as soon as authoritative decisionmakers resolve practical 
challenges to the theory of law.36 The decisions of the ICJ and the WTO 
are such resolutions to challenges. Likewise, theoretical commercial 
contracts turn into sound and operable commercial practice because of 
ICA.  
ICA represents the highest practical dimension of international 
commercial law. The commercial arbitral tribunal that applies the 
provisions of the contract in question addresses the issues that are a result 
of the practical gap in the contract. Arbitration is about the practical 
interpretation of a contract, whereby parties argue that they have acted in 
conformity with the provisions of the contract. ICA is an appropriate 
authority to deal with the practical concerns of the international business 
community. Contracts cannot cover every practical matter. New 
developments and exceptions may emerge over the duration of a written 
agreement that challenge the frontiers of the contract, and only an 
authoritative decisionmaker can decide these frontiers. ICA is such an 
authority in commercial matters. 
The parties to a dispute may invoke different textual or teleological 
interpretations of the commercial contract. For instance, in a contract, the 
parties may stipulate a specific sanction for a specific violation. As to 
whether a court can apply the same sanction if a type of violation is not 
specifically indicated in the contract, the textualist interpretation states that 
one must stick to the wording of the contract and that one cannot enlarge 
or expand the wording of the contract of one’s own volition. Modern 
contract theory, however, favors teleological interpretations and allows for 
the application of the sanction to a non-indicated type of violation with a 
view to realizing the objective of the contract. For the effectiveness of the 
contract in practice, judges may prefer flexible interpretations over 
textualist interpretations. The arbitral tribunal makes this choice.  
                                                                                                             
 36. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 9 (1994) (“To remain ‘legal’ is to ensure that decisions are made 
by those authorized to do so, with important guiding reliance on past decisions, 
and with available choices being made on the basis of community interests and 
for the promotion of common values.”). 
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6. Accessibility 
The accessibility of public international law dispute settlement is 
limited. Even the most accessible dispute settlement methods have a 
certain isolation from the “uninitiated.” For instance, only states can be 
parties to dispute settlement before the ICJ; international organizations, 
corporations, and individuals cannot sue or be sued before the ICJ. A 
background in the ICJ’s functioning and decision-making is necessary to 
understand its jurisprudence. For laymen, it is difficult to analyze the 
references and connections the court makes and to interpret its 
jurisprudence.  
The same inaccessibility applies to the WTO. Indeed, some 
developing countries do not resort to WTO dispute settlement as they find 
it overly complex, costly, and risky, and feel that they possess neither the 
required expertise nor the resources to invoke their rights before WTO 
panels.37 For instance, developing African countries do not challenge U.S. 
cotton subsidies before WTO dispute settlement bodies, although the 
subsidies do, in fact, negatively impinge upon their own cotton trades and 
production to a great extent.38  
In gross terms, public international law dispute settlement has the 
veneer of a club of experts and the initiative of an epistemic community—
consisting of former and present judges, academics, counsels, law firms, 
and legal news reporters—who interpret and contextualize the decisions 
                                                                                                             
 37. Brewster, supra note 16, at 257 (“The economic power of the parties 
remains important because governments must still resort to self-help 
mechanisms—limiting national market access—to enforce WTO decisions. 
Consequently, governments that have large import markets have greater economic 
power to sanction violators.”); id. at 258 (“The European Union’s market is larger 
than Thailand’s and thus the European Union has a greater capacity to sanction 
the United States by restricting access to its market. The United States would 
therefore likely be willing to make greater concessions to the European Union 
than Thailand after an adverse panel ruling.”). 
 38. Krzysztof J. Pelc, Why the Deal to Pay Brazil 300 Million USD Just to 
Keep US Cotton Subsidies Is Bad for the WTO, Poor Countries, and US 
Taxpayers, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/12/why-the-deal-to-pay-brazil-300-million-just-
to-keep-u-s-cotton-subsidies-is-bad-for-the-wto-poor-countries-and-u-s-taxpayer 
s/?utm_term=.f094dc9116c5 [http://perma.cc/GS45-XKC4] (“[T]he other 
countries with a high stake in cotton are poor African nations, and filing a dispute 
comes at considerable financial and political cost . . . . In Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali, known collectively as the ‘Cotton Four’, the more than 10 million 
people relying on cotton revenue will continue to compete against subsidized 
American farmers.”).  
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of the dispute settlement. These “interpreters” constitute something akin 
to a “club” of professionals who constitute and carry the understanding 
and the implementation of the ICJ and WTO decisions—no different than 
in the case of ICA. The much less transparent “jurisprudence” of ICA has 
a certain epistemic community—present and former arbitrators, counsels, 
and law firms. 
In addition to the above evidence, cryptocurrencies and governments’ 
reaction thereto constitute the second proof of the preponderance of 
governments.  
II. CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
 Governments have been trying to deal with cryptocurrencies since 
2008—the date when bitcoin first emerged. The governmental reactions to 
cryptocurrencies demonstrate an interesting government–business rivalry 
in the governance of international financial and commercial law. 
A. Bitcoin as a Challenge to Governments  
Cryptocurrency exists only digitally and relies on cryptography to 
prevent fraudulent transactions.39 Cryptocurrencies have no physical 
representation and are used solely in online transactions.40 At present, 
bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency and presents a challenge to 
government-based public international law by enabling cross border trade 
and finance without national currencies and government oversight. 
Cryptocurrencies upgrade the status of businesspersons, and governments 
are not certain how to treat cryptocurrencies stemming from 
businesspersons.  
Some countries, like Japan, treat bitcoin as valid tender,41 whereas 
others, such as Bangladesh, prohibit its use.42 Bangladesh has even 
legislated prison penalties as the appropriate punishment for the use of 
                                                                                                             
 39. Cryptocurrency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster 
.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency [http://perma.cc/PM96-NDW4] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2019). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Cryptocurrency Regulations in Japan, COMPLYADVANTAGE, https://com 
plyadvantage.com/knowledgebase/crypto-regulations/cryptocurrency-regulations-  
japan/ [http://perma.cc/ZLF7-84PG] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 42. Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World, LIBR. CONG., https:// 
www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php [http://perma.cc/3838-
5VL9] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
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bitcoin. Some countries, such as the Netherlands43 and Turkey,44 have 
adopted a wait-and-see approach, but other countries regard bitcoin as 
property primarily for taxing purposes. Rather than decisively defining 
bitcoin as property, currency, or security, the United States prefers to grant 
licenses to bitcoin exchange agencies and thereby subject them to money 
laundering and other financial supervision regulations.45  
China has prohibited banks and financial institutions from transacting 
with bitcoin, but has not prohibited bitcoin; bitcoin transactions between 
private individuals are permitted.46 Hence, little coherence exists among 
governments vis-à-vis bitcoin and bitcoin transactions. Yet, governments 
around the world wish to control bitcoin, either via regulation, taxation, or 
outright prohibition. Governments regard bitcoin as a challenge to 
government control from the private sphere—from the realm of the 
businessperson.  
Governmental reactions to bitcoin are a stark reminder that they—
governments—wish to control any speculative initiative stemming from 
businesspersons. Businesspersons represent the concept and institution of 
private power, in contrast to and often pitted against public power, which 
the government epitomizes, embodies, and symbolizes. Bitcoin promises 
increased anonymity for private economic actors and helps 
businesspersons to avoid government scrutiny in the management of their 
wealth. Public powers, however, tend to intervene in the private sphere to 
obtain the necessary revenue and resources for providing public services 
and for covering the costs of the state apparatus. 
Governmental intervention takes place if private powers create value. 
Bitcoin creates value, although no precious metal like gold or silver 
supports it, and despite there being no central institution that can underpin 
and guarantee the value of bitcoin. Interestingly, it seems that human 
beings have created a value from nothing through bitcoin.47 Bitcoin’s value 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. 
 44. Interestingly, Turkish authorities have still not made any law or 
regulation in the field of cyrptocurrencies although the trade of cryptocurrencies 
has been increasing in the Turkish market. 
 45. Cryptocurrency Regulations in the United States, COMPLYADVANTAGE, 
https://complyadvantage.com/knowledgebase/crypto-regulations/cryptocurrency-  
regulations-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/7XAV-PKNE] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 46. Cryptocurrency Regulations in China, COMPLYADVANTAGE, https://com 
plyadvantage.com/knowledgebase/crypto-regulations/cryptocurrency-regulations 
-china/ [http://perma.cc/R6HS-B68U] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 47. CNBC, According To Alan Greenspan, Bitcoin Is ‘Not A Rational 
Currency’, YOUTUBE (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yN 
8wQ5c7uk. 
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is that it allows peer-to-peer transactions without any need for an 
intermediary. Bitcoin relies on the belief that there is no need to trust 
government, governmental agencies, or government-confirmed institutions 
to enter into economic transactions.  
Bitcoin is leading the way for other cryptocurrencies, of which there 
are hundreds, although many, if not most, are in fact different versions of 
bitcoin.48 Bitcoin demonstrates a new way of entering into economic 
transactions—proof that transactions across national borders without a 
third party are possible. Bitcoin’s anonymous quality means that it is 
difficult and costly to identify the owner of the bitcoin account. A bitcoin 
user, through his private key, may create dozens of public keys to receive 
and send bitcoins in transactions with other bitcoin users;49 he may use 
multiple accounts to send or receive bitcoins. These accounts—digital 
codes—do not include the identities of bitcoin users, and governments 
therefore invest considerable time, resources, and effort to track and 
identify bitcoin users. To discover the identity of bitcoin users, the 
constant and close supervision of the flow of bitcoins and exchange 
platforms is necessary, which may be ineffective because a bitcoin user 
may use mixers and tumblers50 to make it very difficult to follow the 
transactional trail. Thus, although not impossible, it is a costly challenge 
for law enforcement agencies to trace the owners of bitcoin transactions, 
identify bitcoin users, and tax them.  
The difficulty with tracing bitcoin transactions does not mean that 
governments will stop being governments. An increased use of bitcoins 
and other cryptocurrencies in national and international trade without 
correspondent regulation and taxation terrifies governments. That can be 
inferred, as mentioned above, from different reactions of different 
governments to bitcoin. There exists no coherence. It is the ardent and 
primal wish of governments to identify the owners of wealth and to control 
capital, mostly via taxation. A loss in tax revenue is something all 
governments wish to avert. If the market share of bitcoin transactions 
grows to constitute an important part of national economies, losing tax 
revenue may prove to be a very real and alarming possibility. If bitcoin 
                                                                                                             
 48. Some examples for cryptocurrencies are: Ethereum, Litecoin, and Iota. 
Top 100 cryptocurrencies with their market capitalization are accessible at: 
https://coinmarketcap.com/ [http://perma.cc/X5MM-HHC4] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2019). 
 49. Public Key, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pub 
lic-key.asp [http://perma.cc/28KU-88H8] (last updated July 30, 2018). 
 50. What is a Bitcoin Mixer (Tumbler) and How Does It Work?, CRYPTALKER, 
https://cryptalker.com/bitcoin-mixer/ [http://perma.cc/2PRG-J86V] (last visited Feb. 
7, 2019).  
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users, however, do not use intermediaries such as exchange platforms—
which intermediate by turning bitcoins into national legal currencies and 
vice versa, thus facilitating bitcoin transactions—and only enter peer-to-
peer transactions, it becomes difficult to tax them. Hence, taxing merely 
bitcoin exchange platforms may not be a sufficient method to control the 
overall bitcoin transactions.  
B. Businesspersons and Bitcoin 
Some may argue that bitcoin users are not all businesspersons and that 
ordinary individuals may also be bitcoin users. In this context, bitcoin may 
be a challenge from ordinary citizens to government. Indeed, the purported 
founder of bitcoin’s paper introducing the bitcoin to the international 
community, Satoshi Nakamoto,51 makes the case that bitcoin is a payment 
mechanism, rather than an investment and speculation instrument. 
Ordinary citizens simply wish to use bitcoin to pay for goods and services 
and are therefore not acting as businesspersons.  
In this respect, the term “businessperson” should be clarified to avoid 
distorting the understanding of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. The 
term “businessperson” denotes a person, natural or legal, who enters into 
economic transactions to make advantageous economic exchanges. The 
volume of the economic transactions of the individual and the amount of 
the profit acquired or targeted are not the criteria required to acquire the 
status of a businessperson; what matters is the wish to conduct quick, 
effective, and profitable transactions. Hence, readers should understand 
the term “businessperson” in a broad sense. To use bitcoin merely as a 
payment mechanism may also be a profit as it constitutes a better and more 
profitable payment mechanism for the businessperson. 
The assumption is that businesspersons who wish for security for their 
transactions also wish to avoid the government. Indeed, businesspersons 
would prefer to have their dealings completed as a matter of pure 
confidentiality, without government interference. Governments thus 
represent unwanted but necessary guardians and supervisors of economic 
transactions. In this respect, bitcoin users argue that the network-based 
ecosystem based upon a distributed ledger technology—blockchain 
technology—that confirms and authenticates every transaction involving 
bitcoin provides a natural security for businesspersons.  
                                                                                                             
 51. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WFJ-M3QW] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
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Every businessperson of the network has an access to the ledger.52 
There is no central authority with monopoly on the ledger because every 
transaction is registered on the ledger. There is thus no need for a trusted 
third party—government, a government agency, or any financial or 
bureaucratic institution—to maintain the bitcoin registry and to realize 
bitcoin transactions. The network, not a third party, confirms and validates 
the transaction between the two bitcoin users. Network validations are all 
visible on the distributed ledger. There is no need for a central clearing 
house or a central bank as the guarantor of last resort. Bitcoin is a 
businessperson-to-businessperson enterprise without the need for 
intermediary public powers.  
Bitcoin challenges governments’ control of the legal currency market 
because it proves to governments and the international community that 
private initiatives and private consent may be sufficient to transact 
exchanges. The existence and the value of bitcoin depends merely on the 
participation and the consent of businesspersons. True, a government may 
control bitcoin in the event that it invests huge amounts of computer power 
to produce bitcoins or aggressively buys bitcoins on the market. A group 
of powerful bitcoin users—the early entrants or those with huge capital—
could also try to achieve control of the bitcoin market. Yet, the underlying 
philosophy of bitcoin rested, and continues to rest, on the fact that no 
dominant power would control the production and the ownership of 
bitcoins. The objective is democratization and the privatization of payment 
and exchanges. Bitcoin aims to remain a consensus-based private network.  
Bitcoin is the laboratory that tries to prove that the credit expansion 
banking transactions cause is merely based upon the trust of depositors 
and the citizens in their governments, in government-regulated banks and 
in financial institutions. The criticism that bitcoin is created from nothing, 
that nothing backs it up, and that its value stems merely from people 
jumping on the bandwagon without a rational calculation, is exactly the 
same criticism against the current financial and commercial system of the 
world. Indeed, commercial banks produce credit ten times the value of the 
money central banks create. In banking terms, the process of producing 
credit is called “fractional reserve banking,” through which credit 
expansion is multiplied on the basis of money the central bank prints.53 
                                                                                                             
 52. Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin.asp 
[http://perma.cc/A5DZ-NF5H] (last updated Aug. 5, 2018). 
 53. Fractional reserve banking, CAMBRIDGE U., https://dictionary.cambridge 
.org/dictionary/english/fractional-reserve-banking [http://perma.cc/U96H-7U7L] 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019); Fractional Reserve Banking, INVESTOPEDİA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fractionalreservebanking.asp 
[http://perma.cc/6NHT-M5JL] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018). 
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The credits commercial banks distribute exceed and overspill the money 
collected from depositors. Ordinary citizens believe that banks are selling 
these deposits to the market with interest attached to them and are thus 
profiting from the deposits. Credit that commercial banks give to the 
market, however, is in fact much greater than the money the central bank 
creates and the deposits bank account holders keep.  
This credit expansion is based on the trust ordinary citizens and 
depositors place in the government and government-regulated institutions, 
and the current debt economy rests on this same trust in government. 
Bitcoin wishes to change the direction of citizens’ trust by refocusing it on 
a private network rather than the government. If the government can create 
a value from nothing, that is, if a government can create money and credit 
without any back-up value, then a private network of businesspersons 
should be able to create value from nothing, too. 
If there is no real equivalence between the creation of money and the 
“real” economy of production of goods and services, and if central banks 
can create money on an enormous scale, the fractional reserve banking 
system may be an abuse of the trust citizens place in central banks and 
governments. The reason governments, central banks, commercial banks, 
and national currencies exist is because the general populace trusts them. 
It is the people’s trust that allows them to exist, operate, and prosper. With 
people’s trust in mind, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies exist because 
network members trust them. Bitcoin therefore does not need to 
correspond to the “real” economy of production. Through bitcoin, 
businesspersons may grant the same kind of trust to a non-governmental 
structure.  
C. Bitcoin and International Trade and Finance 
Bitcoin is a challenge to the assumption that monetary, financial, and 
commercial matters are intergovernmental as a matter of nature. In fact, 
this assumption was rooted in the facts on the ground until the emergence 
of bitcoin—a non-governmental currency—in 2008. Non-governmental 
currencies—such as bitcoin—have been increasing their share in 
monetary, financial, and commercial matters worldwide. Rather than 
governments arranging their national currencies and looking to 
intergovernmental institutions such as the IMF for the stabilization of 
world monetary affairs, bitcoin relies solely on the network of bitcoin 
users for the determination of the value of bitcoin. Supply and demand 
alone within the bitcoin user network determine its value.  
The exchange rate of national currencies affects international trade to 
a great extent. Various governments deliberately and systematically try to 
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manipulate their currencies to gain an edge over competitors in 
international commerce. Governments devalue or revalue their national 
currencies against other government currencies. Currently, the biggest 
U.S. complaint about Chinese monetary and commercial policy is that 
China “artificially” keeps its national currency’s value low, which gives 
China an advantage in its export markets, especially when exporting to the 
United States.54 With a low currency, Chinese exports become cheaper and 
thus take a great share of global world markets. 
Bitcoin is a message to the entire world that national fiat currencies55 
and disputes between governments as it relates to the exchange rates of 
these currencies should not monopolize international trade and finance. 
Rather than disputes between governments and the intervention of the IMF 
for the stability of national currencies, bitcoin proposes the supply and 
demand of the bitcoin network. Hence, bitcoin actually challenges the 
international politics of money in that it isolates, within a specified 
network, natural and actual levels of supply and demand, free from 
government intervention. 
Bitcoin does not violate international law. International law does not 
state that only national currencies may exist, nor does it require specific 
fiat currencies to be employed in international trade. International law also 
does not prohibit private digital money, nor does it require a specific 
definition of money. What concerns international law is the proper 
exchange of goods and services with other goods, services, or money. 
Actually, this objective has justified the existence of two international 
organizations—the WTO and the IMF. Indeed, international law is 
technologically neutral in the face of payment mechanisms. This neutrality 
is clearly indicated in the 1996 United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic Commerce56 and the 
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
                                                                                                             
 54. Trump accuses China of ‘manipulating’ its currency, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45251091 [http://perma.cc/4YM 
L-NANW]. 
 55. Fiat currency signifies a currency that precious metals do not back up and 
that has value simply because a government says so. 
 56. MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 3, 
5, 8, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. (1996), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/electcom/V1504118_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/P7QD-Y577] (arts. 
1(a), 5, 7(b), 11). 
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International Contracts.57 International law requires the reliable 
transference of money and data from one party to the other party.  
Bitcoin highlights the basic definition of money. The state need not 
produce money. Money does not need the support of any state. One can 
privately produce it and use it as a medium for investment, storage, and 
exchange. The only element necessary to establish the validity of a form 
of money is trust in the existence of money. If one believes that money 
exists and if one believes he can buy goods and services in exchange for 
it, then money exists. The existence of a state or a state central bank to 
back up money is not necessary. The fiction of money does not need the 
confirmation of the state. Private individuals—businesspersons— may 
sustain it and support it through their network.  
The current international commercial and financial order, however, is 
purportedly based upon national currencies. International law expects the 
exchange of goods and services, the proper payment of debts, and the use 
and transfer of property according to its value by national currency. The 
valuation process is evident in the fact that there is no global money. The 
reestablishment of the international system after World War II did not 
accept the recommendations of economists like John Maynard Keynes to 
create an international currency for the world economy.58 The international 
monetary order was naturally based upon national currencies with the most 
powerful and prestigious national currency—the U.S. dollar—for central 
banks to use as reserve currency all around the world.  
Likewise, previously, “the world of the 1920s was an attempt to 
reconstitute an international monetary order”59 among governments after 
World War I. During World War I, the gold standard was standard, with 
most countries decreeing the use of fiat money with strong foreign 
exchange controls, export-import restrictions, and limitations on the 
outflow of gold.60 The world monetary order was a natural consequence 
of the interaction between national currencies, the most popular reserve 
currency in the period between the two world wars being the British 
pound.  
                                                                                                             
 57. MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 5, 
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. (2007), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CQF-UXCG] (art. 9(1)). 
 58. Ryan Cooper, How John Maynard Keynes’ Most Radical Idea Could 
Save the World, WEEK (May 27, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/626620/how-
john-maynard-keynes-most-radical-idea-could-save-world [http://perma.cc/A4H 
8-NAH3].  
 59. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 437–38 (2002). 
 60. Id. at 439.  
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The German bilateral free trade agreements with various countries 
between the two world wars were a challenge to the British pound in world 
markets as these German-led trade treaties favored the national currencies 
of Germany and its counterparts in bilateral trade rather than the British 
pound.61 The national trade wars, in a way, were also national currency 
wars and represent one of the reasons behind World War II. Post-World 
War II financial and trade organizations—that is, international law—are 
set against this background. 
The current inaction of both the IMF and the WTO in the face of 
bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies evidences the organizations’ 
uncertainty of how to respond. At present, the international organizations 
and governments can tolerate cryptocurrency transactions as long as the 
latter affect only a small share of the world economy. If cryptocurrencies 
begin to occupy an important part of the national market and play more 
prominent roles in international transactions, however, then the IMF and 
the WTO would no longer be able to remain passive. The popularity and 
increasing market share of bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies would 
force the international community to formulate a response.  
If cryptocurrencies are goods or commodities, the WTO can wholly 
regulate the area—the WTO, as an international organization, regulates 
the international trade of goods. But, the WTO has not yet acted in this 
regard. Likewise, the IMF has not taken any initiative for cryptocurrencies. 
The IMF does not have cryptocurrency reserves that could be employed in 
the event of a speculative bitcoin user attack against a national currency. 
Both the WTO and the IMF have adopted a wait-and-see approach. The 
silence of the intergovernmental organizations—the UN, the IMF, and the 
WTO—is unsurprising in the face of digital currencies. International 
organizations can act only if governments have a more or less clear idea 
about what to do with cryptocurrencies.  
For the moment, the reaction of governments need not be direct. 
Governments may keep an eye on the growing cryptocurrency market by 
keeping a certain distance. Rather than directly regulating the 
cryptocurrencies, governments may choose to affect the formation and the 
growth of cryptocurrencies. At the same time, governments may create a 
favorable environment for cryptocurrencies in their national economies 
and boost financial liquidity. Governments may use cryptocurrencies as a 
support for their national economies by giving autonomy to the 
cryptocurrencies within their national borders.  
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The Japanese government’s policy deserves attention. The Japanese 
government endorses cryptocurrencies but maintains a distance from 
them. Although government-backed, the Japanese Authority of Digital 
Assets (“JADA”) was not a governmental organization but a self-
regulatory authority that cryptocurrency operators founded. JADA 
generally advised its members on best practices.62 Hence, the Japanese 
government respects the private nature of the cryptocurrency industry; the 
country prefers self-regulation of the cryptocurrency industry over direct 
government intervention. At present, the Japan Blockchain Association 
(“JBA”) has replaced JADA with more governmental participation. Yet, 
the cryptocurrency industry will probably still exert a strong presence in 
the JBA as well.63 
Private cryptocurrencies are commended as a way of freedom from 
the state and heralded as a victory for private enterprise. The state, 
however, continues to provide the ultimate guarantee against 
cryptocurrency fraud. For instance, when Mt. Gox, the cryptocurrency 
exchange platform in Japan, was declared bankrupt with losses of over 
$500 million worth of digital currencies because of hacking, it was the 
Japanese government and the Japanese courts that were called upon by the 
injured investors to intervene.64 The state provides the ultimate guarantee 
for orderly economic transactions, despite the distance it keeps with 
cryptocurrencies. In other words, the government may be necessary for the 
smooth and effective running of cryptocurrencies.  
The private cryptocurrency network may not function as expected for 
a number of reasons: (1) a minority might capture the network; (2) the 
members of the network may have unequal statuses due to first-comer 
advantages, with members that enter the system at the start having 
advantages that accumulate with the growth of the network; (3) the 
differences between the computer power of the network members may 
have a distorting effect, as members that have more computer power and 
active status in the network can mine and gain more coins than the others 
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on the digital platform; or (4) important discrepancies between the 
network members may appear, and the risk of a limited number of people 
having considerable power is also ever-present. Cryptocurrencies thus 
may not actually be fully egalitarian and fair, which may justify 
government intervention.  
Governments may deem themselves competent to rectify extreme 
inequalities stemming from cryptocurrencies. Extreme inequality may 
disrupt public order and governments have the right and duty to protect 
public order. Indeed, the G-20, the 19 largest economies in the world plus 
the European Union, currently has cryptocurrencies on its agenda.65 It is 
highly unlikely that this collection of the world’s most powerful countries 
would leave cryptocurrencies to operate autonomously without some state 
or government oversight or supervision. Governments would prefer to 
maintain their regulatory role and sovereignty in international financial 
and commercial systems. 
D. Financial Inclusion 
Cryptocurrencies present an attractive opportunity for developing 
countries or, in particular, countries that are alienated from the 
international finance and economy. Rather than try to regulate 
cryptocurrencies, governments themselves may engage in cryptocurrency 
commerce. The insufficient U.S. dollar reserves of some developing 
countries cause considerable difficulties in foreign trade. Developing 
countries with unstable national currencies may tend to opt for a 
cryptocurrency that would facilitate financial and commercial transactions 
in their foreign trade. Through cryptocurrencies, developing countries may 
feel more included within the international trade and finance system that 
currently does not provide adequate rights or access to a large number of 
nations, companies, and individuals.  
For instance, foreign workers could send remittances to their home 
countries in a more cost-effective and efficient manner through bitcoin.66 
Although remittances are an important source of revenue for developing 
countries, sending remittances is still, interestingly, a somewhat costly 
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business.67 Currently, the most popular way of sending money across 
borders takes place through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) system.68 The SWIFT system involves 
fixed fees that are often disproportionate to the value of the money being 
sent.69 Indeed, at the 2009 Summit in Pittsburgh, the G-20 countries 
declared that they wished to improve access to financial services for the 
poor.70 The technology of Ripple, a type of cryptocurrency, has already 
been employed to operate money transfers between many banks.71  
Some governments try to create their own cryptocurrencies. The 
“governmental” process of creating cryptocurrencies, however, runs 
against the basic logic and rationality of cryptocurrencies. 
Cryptocurrencies, foremost among them being bitcoin, have asserted their 
non-state qualities to acquire their current popularity. But some states wish 
to be active actors in the world of cryptocurrencies. For instance, Russia 
has been working on a “national” digital currency. A national currency 
could be a way for Russia to circumvent embargoes the West imposed on 
its economy after the Ukraine-Crimea crisis—the military intervention of 
Russia into Ukraine72—an embargo that has led to huge losses for the 
Russian national currency over the last two years. A Russian 
cryptocurrency could foreseeably help the Russian economy.  
The private nature of cryptocurrencies does not prevent governments 
from adopting or co-opting them. Rather than ban them outright—as 
Bangladesh and Morocco73 have—governments may use cryptocurrencies 
for the furtherance of their national interests. Russia’s initial hesitation 
toward cryptocurrencies is a case in point. Russia initially considered 
banning cryptocurrencies but decided against it, and Russia is now 
working to form its own cryptocurrency.74 Russia’s journey took the 
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country from favoring an outright ban to a position of creating a “national” 
cryptocurrency.75 Likewise, Venezuela has created its own 
cryptocurrency, the “petro,”76 supported by oil and gas. The extreme loss 
of value of the Venezuelan national currency has led the Venezuelan 
government today to regard the cryptocurrency as a panacea for all its 
economic ills, one that will help it overcome and circumvent U.S. 
economic sanctions.  
E. An Inchoate International Financial Law 
As aforementioned, states that are not wholly integrated into the 
international financial system are co-opting cryptocurrencies. States that 
are incurring or that may incur Western economic sanctions are planning 
to employ cryptocurrencies for their own economic, commercial, and 
political objectives. The conspicuous absence of formal international law 
concerning money and finance—in stark contrast to extensive trade 
regulations under WTO law—is a significant contributing factor to 
situation. Rather, what has evolved is an international financial “soft law” 
of sorts.77  
In other words, this bemusement in the face of cryptocurrencies is 
linked to the lack of international law in the field, and government-backed 
cryptocurrencies are entering into this legal vacuum. The bemusement also 
has to do with the apathy of international law in the face of the huge gap 
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between the real economy and its financial counterpart. Several financial 
products do not have real equivalences, notwithstanding their money 
appearance.78 International law does not curb the discrepancy between the 
real production economy and the financial economy, and the UN does not 
regard the economic gap as a matter for international peace and security; 
nor do the IMF and the WTO take measures against highly speculative 
global financial transactions or plug the gap between the real economy of 
production and international finance, although this gap likely caused the 
2007–2008 crisis.  
In 2009, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies took advantage of both the 
under-regulation in international law and the gap between the real and the 
financial economies to place themselves into the financial world.79 Under 
international law, no one can legally or legitimately argue that bitcoin is 
illegal simply because it has no backup value or intrinsic value. 
International law has always condoned the national fiat currencies that 
lack backup value and intrinsic value. Although cryptocurrencies are legal 
in the gray area, international financial law itself was a gray area before 
the advent of cryptocurrencies, cryptocurrencies have merely highlighted 
this grayness.  
Governments wish to remain the intermediaries in this gray global 
economic and financial system. Governments established the post-1945 
world economic system. The international economic organizations that 
constitute the bedrock of the current global economic relations—such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO—all came into being because of 
the cooperation of governments under the leadership of the victors of 
World War II. It is all the more understandable that governments do not 
want to leave the most important terrain of global economy—money—to 
businesspersons.  
Most states will likely continue to strive for the regulation and the 
taxation of cryptocurrencies.80 The governmental effort for regulation may 
damage cryptocurrencies; that is, their prices may be negatively affected. 
Governments will argue that cryptocurrencies create too many 
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speculations and that the government ought to protect citizens and 
consumers against them.81 The more cryptocurrencies are regulated and 
have the shadow of the state looming over them, the more their “private 
nature” will be endangered. Actually, “[w]ere bitcoin stripped of its near-
anonymity, it would be hard to justify its current price.”82  
CONCLUSION  
ICA and cryptocurrencies are typical examples of businesspersons’ 
challenges to governments. International commercial and financial law 
constitute a contested terrain for both parties. Government–businessperson 
interaction is inherent in international organizations. Governments still 
have an edge over businesspersons in the current world system, yet, the 
challenge from businesspersons is possible, in particular, where 
government-based international law does not adequately respond to the 
current needs of international trade and finance. Businesspersons fill the 
gaps governments leave and they thus force governments to act. Indeed, 
in the field of ICA and bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, 
businesspersons force governments to act. In particular, the current 
popularity of bitcoin stems from the fact that bitcoin seems to upgrade the 
prospects of businesspersons to an unexpected degree vis-à-vis 
governments.  
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